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 
Abstract—The process to obtain biodiesel is simple, however 
it is a chemical process in which toxic and flammable substances 
are used or variables like temperature or pressure should be 
controlled to avoid any kind of incident. Literature report 
accidents where most human errors are related to the confidence 
of operators by this simplicity. Much of these accidents are 
influenced by a number of factors involved constituting latent 
failures. This paper presents a summary of latent failures 
identified on biodiesel plants and a description of their causes 
and the accepted practices to eliminate them. 
 




UMAN RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT (HRA) is the common 
name for an assortment of methods and models that are 
used to predict the occurrence of human errors. HRA 
involves the use of qualitative and quantitative methods to 
assess the human contribution to risk. 
Disasters and major system failures are frequently a 
sequence of events where one or more people have made a 
decision or taken some action while operating, maintaining 
or repairing some technological system.  
According to [1] human reliability can be defined as 
maximizing the effectiveness of the decisions people make 
and the actions they take in response to those decisions while 
operating, maintaining or recovering from the failures of 
systems. Other constrain may apply, such as time limits for 
completing a task. 
According to [2] some of the most important factors that 
can undermine the validity of an HRA include: 
- Expert judgment. 
- Impact of task context upon human error probabilities 
(HEP). 
- Sources of data in HRA techniques.  
 
 
Practically all HRA methods share the point of view that it 
is meaningful to use the concept of human error estimating 
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human error probabilities. A new point of view takes into 
account how human performance is determined   by   the 
context or circumstances. The attention has shifted to the 
managerial and organizational contexts that create the latent 
conditions for such failures [1], [13].  
In this point, it is important to distinguish two kinds of 
error: active errors and latent errors. Active errors are those 
whose effects are felt almost immediately. Latent errors are 
those whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within 
the system for a long time, only becoming evident when they 
combine with other factors to breach the system´s defenses 
[3].  
II. HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS ON BIODIESEL PLANTS 
Like other industries, it is necessary to improve the 
reliability of operation process, inspection, maintenance and 
projects during assembly of equipment [4].  
An analysis of reported accidents shows that most human 
errors are related to the confidence of the operators by the 
simplicity of the process [5].  
The relevant accidents occurred in the biofuel industry in 
the last decades have been presented and analyzed in the 
open literature. Errors of commission, omission and 
neglected actions are the main cause of human errors [5]-[8].  
Human errors can be classified a number of ways [14]: 
- errors of commission or omission. Errors of 
commission mean that someone did an act that resulted in an 
error. Errors of omission are where someone did not do 
something that created an error.  
- Active or latent errors. In active errors the consequence 
is immediate, while a latent error ´s consequence is not.  
- Random human error or where human factors are 
involved. 
- Human errors can also be classified as to the reason the 
error was made. They are grouped into three broad 
categories: people-oriented errors, situation-oriented errors 
and system-oriented errors. 
In this paper it is introduced a discussion about latent 
errors.  
III. LATENT ERRORS 
Most accidents in process industries are caused by 
operator errors. In most cases, they are affected by the 
failure of design and organization. They are known as latent 
errors [15].  
It is not possible to design technological systems to 
eliminate all human errors during operation because people 
are involved in specifying, designing, implementing, 
installing, commissioning and maintaining systems as well as 
operating them. Even if systems can operate without human 
intervention, there is still the possibility of human error at 
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other phases of the lifecycle [16].  
It is essential to know what people did inappropriately in 
order to identify the latent causes, even though no-one wants 
to divulge this type of information [17].  
According to [9], Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) 
are those factors which influence human error rates. Typical 
PSFs include level of training, quality/availability of 
procedural guidance, time factors, etc.   
In reviewing some of the techniques of human reliability 
analysis shows that there are uncertainties that have not yet 
been resolved. Component reliability principles and methods 
are used, which puts estimating human error probability at 
the same level as estimating failure probability.   
These methodologies favoring psychologically based 
models remain anchored to the interior stage of the cognitive 
process and do not highlight the link with external conditions 
[18]. 
It is accepted that human errors is affected by a wide 
range of factors [5], [10]-[12]. Each technique reported in 
literature use a different terminology for contextual factors: 
Performance Shaping Factors, Factors, Common 
Performance Modes, Performance Influencing Factors, 
Influence Factors and Performance Conditions [19]-[33]. 
This different terminology used was reviewed and a summary 
is introduced in the following. 
 
A. Performance Shaping Factors  
This terminology is used in techniques like THERP, 
SPAR-H, SLIM-MAUD, HRMS, JHEDI, ATHEANA, 
CAHR and in other models and taxonomies [19], [21], [22], 
[24]-[28], [30]. A PSF is an aspect of the human’s individual 
characteristics, environment, organization, or task that 
specifically decrements or improves human performance, 
thus respectively increasing or decreasing the likelihood of 
human error [11]. 
 
B. Error Producing Conditions 
This terminology is used in techniques like HEART [19], 
[20] and NARA [27]. It can be broadly considered as factors 
that negatively affect the reliability of human performance. 
 
C. Common Performance Conditions 
This terminology is used in CREAM and INCORRECT 
techniques [21], [24], [33]. Context information has very 
important role in defining possible error modes. It represents 
the work conditions under which the task is performed. 
Working conditions can be characterized using 9 factors 
called Common Performance Conditions [36]. 
 
D. Performance Influencing Factors 
This terminology is used in INTENT technique [24], 
multifaceted taxonomy for description and analysis of events 
involving human malfunction [29], Taylor-Adams and 
Macwans [24] and Julius´ Procedure for the analysis of 
errors of commission [24], [32]. 
E. Factors 
This terminology is used in Human Performance Data 
Base [27] with the same meaning of Influencing Factors. 
 
F. Common Performance Modes 
This terminology is used in Contextual Control Model 
[27].  This model of control mode transition consists of a 
number of factors, including the human operator's estimate 
of the outcome of the action (success or failure), the time 
remaining to accomplish the action (adequate or inadequate), 
and the number of simultaneous goals of the human operator 
at that time. 
 
G. Influencing Factors 
This terminology is used in Gerdes´s Model for Cognitive 
Behaviour and Cognitive Error Classification [31]. They are 
a set of relevant contextual factors with qualitative 
descriptors of level of influence. 
 
A latent failure is the result of a decision or a measure 
taken much before the accident, although the consequences 
can be dormant for a long time. These failures usually have 
their origin at the level of the Manager to take decisions, 
Manager of the regulation or the administrators of the 
company, i.e., depend on people who are far removed in time 
and space of the resulting event. These failures can also be 
produced at any level of the system on the basis of the 
human condition, for example, low motivation or fatigue. In 
addition, the study of the factors of performance is not only 
useful to prevent errors and accidents, but also to improve 
the efficiency and the workload of the operators. 
IV. LATENT FAILURES IN A BIODIESEL PLANT 
The process to obtain biodiesel is simple, however it is a 
chemical process in which toxic and flammable substances 
such as methanol, sodium hidroxide, sulfuric acid, and others 
are used, or variables like temperature or pressure should be 
controlled to avoid any kind of incident. Therefore, operators 
should be very careful during all the process, especially 
during storage and handling not only of the raw material but 
also of the products and by-products. The facility can work 
several years without experiencing any problem but that no 
means that adopted work methods, designs or procedures 
are reliable and safety.      
Reason [34], [35] developed the “Swiss cheese model” 
which involves various layers of defences. According to this 
model, incident or accident causation is characterised by the 
successive penetration of these defences by either active 
failures or latent conditions. Active failures are defined as 
unsafe acts committed by people in the form of slips, lapses, 
mistakes and violations. These have typically been the 
traditional focus of investigations of human error. Latent 
conditions, or latent failures, can arise from factors such as 
organisational culture, management decisions, the design of 
procedures, or deficiencies in training. They can translate 
into error provoking conditions or they can create 
weaknesses in the organisation’s defences which may lie 
dormant within the system, until when combined with active 
 
failures, they contribute to the occurrence of an incident or 
accident. Latent conditions can be identifies and remedied 
before an adverse event occurs.  
Literature report accidents where most human errors are 
related to the confidence of operators by the simplicity of the 
process; nevertheless the level of human reliability largely 
depends on the number of factors involved and that may 
constitute latent failures [5]. The main factors to take into 
account are: feasibility, context, ability and ambient. 
 
V. MAIN LATENT FAILURES IDENTIFIED 
Due to the simplicity of the process are possible find latent 
failures with ease. In small-scale production frequently the 
process is not automated and the intervention of human is 
more than the necessary. From the literature reviewed in this 
work and the data collection in Argentina, the main latent 
failures identified are related with procedures, storage, 
process tasks, safety precautions and processing equipment.  
In the following each cause of latent failure identified is 
descripted joint to their associated problem and an accepted 




Cause of Latent failure 
Scarcity of written procedures or available procedures 
little detailed. It is required the presence of the most 
experienced operator who indicates steps to follow. 
 
Associated problems 
In case of absence of this operator (due to a personal 
problem, accident or death) details of the procedure to 
obtain biodiesel are not available. 
 
Accepted practices 
It is highly recommended to write detail procedures so all 
the temporary workers will have complete and standard 
information not only for training but also to follow proper 




Cause of Latent failure 
Lack of a place to store raw material (oil) and by-products 
of the process (glycerol, and water washing). Sometimes 




Reduced space to move when making processing tasks.  A 
source of fuel in case of fire. 
 
Accepted practices 
It is desirable to have a place to store tanks separated 
from the process building.     
 
C. Process tasks  
Cause of Latent failure 




Inhalation of low levels of sodium hydroxide as dusts or 




Buy liquid catalyst or one that does not need to be 
grinding it. 
 
D. Safety precautions 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Sometime operators know main risks of working with 
methanol and sodium hydroxide. However they do not have 




In case of an accident, chemical information is not readily 
available for all workers or third parties involved. 
 
Accepted practices 
Dispose a place within the processing facility, where the 
Material Safety Data Sheets are kept readily accessible. This 
will allow workers and fire or emergency personnel to readily 
locate chemical safety information in case of an accident. 
Also, this is convenient to keep in mind the proper personal 
safety equipment required to manipulate chemical 
substances. 
 
E. Processing equipment 1 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Sometimes the addition of sodium hydroxide in methanol 




This design can result in increased fire risk, increased 
worker methanol exposure, and reduced fuel quality due to 
evaporation of methanol from the mixing tank. 
 
Accepted practices 
A closed system, wherein oil, chemicals, and end products 
can be safely transferred using pumps, tubing, and valves is 
ideal. Use of devices with sparking electric motors, near 
open containers of methanol also presents a fire risk and 
must be avoided. 
 
F. Processing equipment 2 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Sometimes pressure relief of the reactor must be done 
 
manually by opening a plug in its upper part. 
 
Associated problems 
Even experienced operators can forget to relief pressure 
when necessary in the process and overpressure may occur. 
 
Accepted practices 
It is recommended to automate this step in the process.   
 
G. Processing equipment 3 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Sometimes the opening and closing of valves that 
determine the direction of flow of different fluids of the 
process is made by hand and do not have a step-by-step 
guide for the state of valves. 
 
Associated problems 
Even experienced operators can make mistakes, and 
opening (or failing to open) certain valves during processing 
stages may result in spills or accidental release of dangerous 
chemicals into the workspace. 
 
Accepted practices 
Develop a well-thought out process diagram, including 
step-by-step guidelines for the state of valves and switches 
during different stages of production. This diagram should be 
posted on or near fuel-making equipment, to serve as a 
reference for all trained operators. 
 
H. Processing equipment 4 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
In the step of adding sodium methoxide to the reactor, it is 
important that all operate properly. 
 
Associated problems 
Spills or releases can take place. 
 
Accepted practices 
It is recommended that each task performed should be 
registered and checked frequently by all the operators who 
work in the process avoiding possible mistakes or duplication 
of tasks. 
 
I. Washing fuel 1 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Inappropriate design of the plant and/or inadequate 
equipment to make washing fuel. 
 
Associated problems 
Operators can suffer burns when moving the hot water 
bucket. When opening the upper inlet of the reactor 
methanol vapours can be released. 
 
Accepted practices 
It is recommended to check the design of the plant and 
study the possibility to incorporate necessary equipment to 
do the water heating. 
 
J. Washing fuel 2 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Methanol is not recovered from the biodiesel fuel prior to 
do the washing. 
 
Associated problems 
The waste water from the first wash will contain 
significant methanol. The use of this water can increment fire 
risk due to flammable methanol vapours and can be 
dangerous to the operator’s health.   
 
Accepted practices 
Waste water from the first wash should be handled with 
care and it is recommended not to use it for other purposes. 
 
K. Labeling stored fluids 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Labelling stored fluids is missing.  
 
Associated problems 
It can occur a misuse of the stored substance. In case of 
accident, emergency- service personnel or operators do not 
know what they are dealing with.   
 
Accepted practices 
To be sure labelling all storage containers to avoid 
accidental misuse and to identify easily each stored 
substance. 
 
L. By- product handling and disposal 
 
Cause of Latent failure 
Inappropriate extract of by-product glycerol.  
 
Associated problems 
Crude glycerol by-product is contaminated with methanol 
(approximately 25% by volume) and as such may be 
considered hazardous waste. Methanol will not evaporate 
from stored glycerol at ambient temperatures sufficiently to 
consider the glycerol uncontaminated. As consequence, 
improper handling can cause health problems to operators or 
create a source of ignition.  
 
Accepted practices 
It should be handled as if it were methanol: wearing gloves 
and goggles and avoiding any concentrated vapors. It is 
highly recommended to recover methanol from glycerol via 
distillation, prior to disposal or further use. This practice 
reduces environmental pollution and allows producers to 




VI. SUMMARY OF REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS 
Old works show that most human error is related to the 
confidence of the operators by the simplicity of the process. 
Like other chemical process a number of factors involved 
may constitute latent failures and it is highly recommended: 
-  write detailed procedures; 
-  have a place to store tanks separated from the process 
building; 
-  buy liquid catalyst or one that does not need to be 
grinding it. 
-  dispose a place within the processing facility, where the 
Material Safety Data Sheets can keep readily accessible; 
-  having a closed system, wherein oil, chemicals, and end 
products can be safely transferred using pumps, tubing and 
valves; 
-  use devices with sparking electric motors, near open 
containers of methanol presents a fire risk and must be 
avoided; 
-  develop a well-thought out process diagram, including 
step-by-step guidelines for the state of valves and switches 
during different stages of production; 
-  each task performed should be registered and checked 
frequently by all the operators who work in the process 
avoiding possible mistakes or duplication of tasks; 
- check the design of the plant and study the possibility to 
incorporate necessary equipment to do the water heating; 
- waste water from the first wash should be handled with 
care and it is recommended not to use it for other purposes; 
-  label all storage containers to avoid accidental misuse 
and to identify easily each stored substance; 
-  recover methanol from glycerol via distillation, prior to 
disposal or further use. This practice reduces environmental 
pollution and allows producers to reuse methanol, reducing 
in this way costs and improving energy balance. 
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